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ABSTRACT 
 
Following the liberalization wave in the airline sector, airports have been gradually taken 
out of the public sphere and open to the private initiative. This phenomenon is generally 
referred to as privatization, but not all the cases consist of, in fact, a full divestiture of 
assets. Although infrastructure construction, management and financing are undertaken by 
the private sector during a pre-defined period, usually 30 years or more, the property 
remains public or is transferred to the public domain after that period. This is a form of 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) where two different models can be found: institutionalized 
PPP or a typical contractual regime, such as the concession arrangements. PPP options have 
been a “hot” topic over the last decade, being developed in several sectors, such as energy, 
water, road and seaports transportation infrastructures, etc, but few studies in the literature 
can be found on the PPP projects development in airport systems, for example, as far as 
risk-sharing is concerned. This paper looks at recent developments in airport “privatization” 
and “deregulation”, distinguishing privatizations from PPP arrangements, through a case 
study approach, and establishing a comparative analysis of different PPP models used for 
airport management. Some comments are made about the Portuguese model and the 
announcement of future privatization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Air transport has known the involvement of private companies in the provision of services, 
for some decades. It first started in the late 1970s, with the deregulation of the US domestic 
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market,1 which allowed for a revolution in the industry, fostering the development of low 
cost carriers (Southwest already existed since the late 60’s), increasing competition, and 
thus decreasing fares and stimulating traffic growth. In Europe the market deregulation 
only arrived in 1997, after several Packages of reform had been released (Button et al., 
2005).2  
 
The liberalization trend has moved airlines from State control and introduced a market 
oriented approach, focusing on clients, deciding routes on a commercial basis, instead of 
political arrangements between countries, and decreasing average fares. This also had 
impact on infrastructure providers, changing their governance models, and the market 
structure. In the 1980s, for example, the British government started the privatization of the 
British Airport Authority (BAA). At that time, the “Thatcher government” was trying to 
sell assets to get easy and fast money (Thatcher, 1993). Airports, unlike airlines, are an 
extremely profitable business, and therefore valuable, as they enjoy a monopolistic position 
and government protection (Bel and Fageda, 2009; Button et al., 2007).  
 
In fact, the rationale that led the British government to sell the BAA 26 years ago is still 
one of the main reasons why governments proceed to divestitures in airports today: making 
a lot of fast money (Truitt and Esler, 1996). Worldwide, privatization of airports, similarly 
to the BAA, has had difficulties. In the short run, these may simply be associated with 
ineffective private operation and the government’s loss of control of a strategic sector. In 
the case of Argentina and Honduras, for example, it appears that the foreign investors paid 
too much for the airports and were unable to fulfill the expectations and commitments 
assumed before the government sellers (Lipovich, 2008).  
 
The US did not follow the world trend of privatization, and kept a public ownership model 
for most airports in American soil. This does not mean the absence of private participation 
in the airport value chain. The US model kept the asset (airport site) in the public 
ownership sphere and allowed for private investment in terminals and other facilities inside 
the airport perimeter (Fuhr and Beckers, 2009). It basically disaggregated the air and the 
land side, unbundling the infrastructure.  
 
These two sub-systems have completely different characteristics. One may argue that the 
air side (runways, taxiways and parking stands) may be seen as a natural monopoly (with a 
public service obligation: allowing airport access for all those companies interested in), 
while land side (terminals, car parking, shopping facilities, etc.) are more easily delivered 
under a market competition model. This model can also be found in maritime ports, under 
the designation of “landlord ports” (see Cruz and Marques, 2010)3.  
                                               
1
 The US Airline Deregulation Act can be pointed out as the first step towards the deregulation of the entire 
industry (see about the airline deregulation and its consequences Good et al., 1993) 
2
 The First Package was released in 1987, “lightning” the Air Service Agreements (ASA’s); the Second 
Package in 1990, removing government intervention in air fares and facilitating access to markets; and the 
Third Package in 1991, which led to the deregulation of EU domestic market in 1997.  
3
 The port authority is responsible for canal access and maritime navigation, while terminal facilities are 
managed by private operators, competing for traffic in the same port.  
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Under this model, many airlines have invested in terminal facilities, developing tailor-made 
facilities to their needs, and establishing long relationships with airports, which can also be 
achieved, indirectly, through vertical contracts (Barbot, 2009).  
 
While in the airline sector the shift was towards the development of privately run firms, 
based on full divestitures with no intervention, direct or indirect, from governments, airport 
governance models are far more complex. With few exceptions, the public sector still 
retains some degree of participation in the infrastructure development, management, 
financing and/or operation, and in Europe the co-existence of private and public sectors is 
common (Oum et al., 2008).  
 
It is possible to identify a variety of schemes for this involvement, though no irrefutable 
evidence is found on what model maximizes welfare. Standing at a point where the 
growing private sector participation in the airport management is unquestionable, this paper 
tries to look back and observe the multiple ways chosen towards that objective: increasing 
private sector involvement.  
 
An overview on the private management of different air transport systems is provided as a 
review on the definition and rationale of PPP options, as well as a short discussion on what 
has been the late evolution on the use of this instrument of procurement. Some notes are 
also drawn about the Portuguese privatization process, which will be linked to the 
construction of the new Lisbon Airport, the largest brand new airport to be developed in 
Europe for the years to come.  
 
 
2. PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE AIR TRANSPORT VALUE-
CHAIN 
 
2.1 Non-infrastructure related activities 
 
Before discussing the existing models for private involvement in airport infrastructure 
management, a brief overview will be made on the private participation in other non-
infrastructure related activities. The air transport value-chain can be divided into several 
segments, but the most recognizable elements by passengers are the airlines and the 
airports. Nevertheless, according to each airport model, several other agents can be found, 
such as ground handling companies, retailers (commercial areas inside airports), catering 
companies, car-parking operators, airplane maintenance, cleaning and security in terminal 
areas, among others (Ashford et al., 1997). Some of these activities are internalized by the 
airport manager or by the airline, like the ground handling. In some cases, specific 
companies were created by the airport/airline to develop ground handling activities. For 
example, Fraport, the airport manager in Frankfurt, has been widening its business to areas 
such as: ground handling and logistics, real-estate, security, advertising, consulting, etc. In 
Lisbon airport there are two handling companies performing in the airport, one is owned by 
the national carrier TAP (GroundForce), and the other by the airport manager ANA 
(Portway). Private sector participation in handling services in European Airports was 
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possible due to the Directive 96/67/EC, under the auspices of an increase in efficiency and 
social welfare.  
 
The objectives are yet to prove, but there is a clear trend to the increase of private capital in 
these firms, fostered by the market liberalization and changes both in the airline market and 
in the airport business (Tomová, 2009). 
 
Nowadays most ground handling operators are privately run after being sold by airlines that 
developed a strategy of focusing on their core business. Lufthansa, American Airlines, 
British Midland and SN Brussels, are some examples of airlines that alienated handling 
activities. However, some of them retained the capacity for self-handling at the base airport. 
In this context, global handling firms have emerged, operating at a global scale, such as 
Servisair that operates in 175 airports, Swissport in 174, Worldwide in 120, Menzies in 112 
and some smaller ones like AviaPartner which is present in 35 airports.4  
 
Even Air Traffic Control Systems, which were, and still are in most countries, under public 
control, have been privatized. Canada privatized its air traffic control system in 1996, 
selling it to a private enterprise, NAV Canada. Before that, in 1987, New Zeeland Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) services were commercialized and nowadays they are a government 
corporation, with revenues coming directly from their activities (air traffic navigation and 
consulting activities) and directed by an independent board of directors, whose dividends 
are distributed to the shareholders (Betancor and Rendeiro, 1999). In this case, shareholders 
are public entities, the Ministers for State-Owned Enterprises and Finance. Though this is 
not a private company, it clearly has an organization model that allows it to work like a 
privately run enterprise. In the case of the UK, a PPP arrangement was established. In 2009, 
46% of the capital of the National Air Traffic System, Ltd., was sold to Airline Group, the 
chosen partner, and 5% to the staff, creating a mixed (public and private) firm.5  
 
On the non-aeronautical activities group, the private participation is even deeper. The 
liberalization and the increasing pressure by airlines and governments to cut aeronautical 
taxes forced airports to explore new sources of revenue – non-aeronautical revenues 
(single-till principle). In most, if not all, the largest international airports, non-aeronautical 
revenues have accounted for more than 50% of all airport revenues (Freathy, 2004). These 
activities are essentially retail, real-estate development and car parking.  
 
The airport authority (public or private) may develop these activities on a stand-alone basis, 
but this is becoming less common. Especially in retailing, where large groups have been 
specializing and operating at a global scale (for example: Westfield Airport Retail or 
Hochtief AirPort Retail). These groups, and others of smaller dimension, can operate at the 
airport site under concession and joint ventures arrangements. In the first case, the airport 
authority works like a landlord, awarding the retail activities for which the private partner 
pays a fee. This concession period can vary between 1 and 10 years, and the fees paid can 
                                               
4
 Data collected from the companies websites on June 2010.  
5
 For more information on ATC commercialization, see Button (2005).  
- 5 - 
range from 5% to 45% of the net profit (Fuhr and Beckers, 2009). Examples of flat fee 
models, where a fixed, pre-determined amount is set between the concessionaire and the 
landlord can also be found. Management contracts option, based on the principle that a 
party will manage the business on behalf of the authority, is also an arrangement used. The 
BAA, in the late 90’s, changed its duty-free business from a concession to a management 
contract type (Fuhr and Beckers, 2009).   
 
2.2. Infrastructure related activities 
 
Regarding infrastructure development, there is a wide portfolio for private sector 
involvement schemes. On the one hand, the private sector may only be contracted to 
perform civil works under government specifications, also known as public work contracts, 
for which it receives a fixed sum, assuming only the risk inherent to construction. On the 
other hand, the government may sell an asset and the private sector will operate, manage, 
develop and finance that infrastructure in order to meet quality standards, usually 
determined by a regulator, which is called divestiture or privatization. Table 1 shows 
different arrangements for private sector involvement in infrastructure provision.  
 
Table 1 – Models for private sector involvement in infrastructure provision 
Type of private sector 
involvement Description 
Legal 
ownership of 
assets 
Public Work Contracts 
Private sector only performs pre-determined tasks 
to the service provider, with no responsibility for 
the final service quality. 
Public 
Technical Assistance Contracts 
Continuum contracts between private and public 
sectors to ensure an adequate quality level in a sub-
system. 
Public 
Sub-Contracting or Outsourcing 
The public sector contracts a private company to 
ensure a certain service, for which the private 
sector is entirely responsible. 
Public 
Management Contracts Based on a set of objectives and targets, the private 
sector manages the service for the “owner”. Public 
Leasing (Affermage) 
The private sector assumes at its own risk the 
provision of the service, for which the public sector 
pays a lease fee. It is not responsible for making 
investments. 
Public 
Concession (BOT or other 
schemes) 
The private sector is responsible for providing the 
service, and also, for financing the investments 
required. After the concession period, the assets 
return to the public sphere. 
Public 
BOO The same as BOT, but without the transfer at the 
end of the period. Private 
Divestiture1 Complete transfer of assets from the public sector to a private entity. Private 
1Divestiture can be divided into divestiture by sale and divestiture by license (Guasch, 2004) 
 
Theoretically, this categorization clarifies the different relationships established, but reality 
suggests a far more complex set of models, especially concerning issues like asset 
- 6 - 
ownership, risk allocation (incentives to efficiency) and investment decisions, to name a 
few. The asset ownership is a key element to understand these types of models (Betancor 
and Rendeiro, 1999). For instance, in privatization and BOO regimes, the private firm owns 
ad aeternum the infrastructure, while in concession arrangements it can (or not) own the 
asset but only until the end of their term. In fact, the concession model that is generally 
referred to as a PPP of contractual type is structurally different from ‘pure’ privatization. 
Privatization involves a change in property, moving assets from the public to a private 
sphere. Even though the term privatization is commonly used, it does not represent the real 
concept behind it. For example, when Australia privatized its airports, it actually sold 50 
year leases with the option to renew if certain conditions were met. Similarly, the Canadian 
national government privatized its major airports by leasing them to local public-private 
agencies operating like private firm. Other countries have privatized airports or portions of 
airports through concessions lasting 30 years or more, for instance Argentina, Greece, Peru, 
and the Philippines (Graham, 2008; Juan, 1996 and Lipovich, 2008). Risk allocation, more 
than an objective, should be a tool to be used by governments to foster efficiency (Dey et 
al., 2002; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). Note that in traditional procurement methods or 
public work contracts, the private sector only deals with its own production risk, related to 
the construction or maintenance activity. On the opposite side, full privatization delivers all 
risks to the private sector, since the principle behind privatization is to deliver the service to 
the market. Each of these models represents an “all or nothing” perspective on risk 
assumption. Concessions are somewhere in between. The different types of risk in service 
provision (commercial, production and context)6 can be allocated to either the private or the 
public sector, or even, the same risk can be partially assumed by both sides (Marques and 
Berg, 2010). A good example is the commercial risk, where it is usual to find a co-
responsibility of both the agents (Nisar, 2007). With investment decisions the framework is 
similar. There is no autonomy in deciding if and when new investments should be made, 
and there is total independence when the infrastructure is private. In concessions there is 
usually a capacity upper limit that, when exceeded, triggers an investment in capacity 
expansion. If the time remaining for the concession term is not enough to ensure the return 
of the investment, two paths are generally considered: at the end of the period the 
government pays the concessionaire the remaining non-depreciated investment, or more 
commonly, the concession is renegotiated being the extension to the concession term the 
most usual option.7  
 
 
3. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ARRANGEMENTS 
 
3.1 Definition 
 
In 1992, the expression “Private Finance Initiative” (PFI) was introduced in the Autumn 
Statement, by the then Chancellor Norman Lamont, with the “aim of achieving closer 
                                               
6
 These types of risk will be explained in the next section applied to airport development and management.  
7
 See more in Guasch et al. (2006). The option for the provision of an extension to the concession term is that 
which causes fewer conflicts between the different stakeholeders.  
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partnerships between the public and the private sector” (Allen, 2001). It is important to 
remind that its appearance in 1992, eight years after the privatization of the BAA, draws the 
distinction between privatization and the establishment of partnerships between public and 
private sectors. The sustaining principle of the initiative that still remains today was the 
total or partial transfer of risks inherent to public service provision to the private sector 
(Phang, 2007). Public service provision has been a government responsibility. The 
difficulty in providing the necessary capabilities (mainly capital outlays) to expand and 
rehabilitate infrastructures as well as to control cost overruns in the development of large 
scale infrastructures (Skamris and Flyvbjerg, 1997), and the need to achieve higher levels 
of efficiency in the management of services gave birth to a procurement model that 
promised to solve these questions, or at least appeared to do so. Through a single contract, 
the private operator is responsible for the infrastructure development and service provision 
throughout a long period. For that service, it receives a fee from users, and/or, a payment 
from the government.8  
 
Grimsey and Lewis (2004) define PPP projects as “arrangements whereby private parties 
participate in, or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure, and (…) a project 
results in a contract for a private entity to deliver public infrastructure-based services”.9  
 
3.2 The rationale for PPP projects usage 
 
Some argue that this model allows the government to focus the scarce public resources on 
areas not covered by PPP projects, or that the competition and the scrutiny of the capital 
markets done by the private sector make the use of capital resources more effective 
(Guasch, 2004; Engel, 2009). PPP proponents argue that this procurement model provides 
higher value-for-money and boosts efficiency. Nonetheless, both these arguments lack 
irrefutable evidence.  
 
What is clear is that, as Engel claims, PPP arrangements have the merit of bringing 
competition to infrastructure provision.10 But the “off balance sheet” status of this model, 
unaccountable for the public deficit calculation, lead to an abuse in the usage of this 
procurement methodology, to the extreme of allowing for economically impracticable  
projects to go forward because the government assures the return of the investor by 
assuming all (or most of) the commercial risk.  
 
The premise for PPP projects usage is a significant risk assumption by the private party 
(Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Meda, 2007). It is due to the exposure of risk that the full 
potential of efficiency gains is leveraged, though risk aversion by the private sector should 
                                               
8
 Engel et al. (2009) present several configurations for these payments: up-front payments, shadow tolls and 
availability payments. 
9
 In the EU, PPP arrangements are defined as “forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world 
of business which aim to ensure the funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance of an 
infrastructure or the provision of a service” (European Commission, 2004).  
10
 Regarding competition in infrastructure provision, it is categorized into competition for the field, and 
competition in the field (Demsetz, 1968).  
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be expected (Moles and Williams, 1995). The “protection” of some projects by the 
government, guaranteeing a risk-free continuum cash flow throughout the project lifespan, 
takes the merit the PPP model has of selecting those projects with negative NPV. The 
private sector ability to evaluate the projects would put them aside, focusing on those with 
an expected positive NPV.   
 
3.3 Recent evolution 
 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) estimated that between 1990 and 2006, more than 
one thousand PPP projects have been developed in Europe in a total of €bn 200, and more 
€Bn 73 are planned for the years to come. The use of this procurement scheme has been 
growing significantly since the mid 1990s, as observed in Figure 1, but the geographical 
distribution of projects is not homogeneous. In fact, according to the EIB, the UK 
accounted for 58% of the total value, and France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
accounted for further 30%. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Evolution of European PPP projects between 1990 and 2006 (Source: PFI Database, World Bank) 
 
 The World Bank also reported an increase in the usage of PPP arrangements, mostly 
financing concession arrangements which account for 60% of the total US$Bn 30, since 
1991 (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 – Projects with private participation financed by the World Bank (1991-2008) 
 
Concession Divestiture Greenfield project 
Management and 
lease contract TOTAL 
Total number of projects 59 22 32 19 132 
Total investment (US $ million) 18,090 3,115 4,280 4,559 30,044 
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3.4 Types of PPP projects 
 
Allen (2001) presents three types of projects under the broad PFI concept: free-standing 
projects, joint ventures and services sold. Free-standing projects are the ones where the 
private sector undertakes a project, recovering the costs (and the return on the investment), 
through charges. Queen Elizabeth II (Dartford) or Vasco da Gama (Lisbon) bridges can be 
pointed out as some examples. The author argues that in cases where full cost recovery can 
be achieved exclusively through charges to users, there is no need for Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) calculation.11 In joint venture projects the public sector contributes 
directly to the project, although the private sector assumes the overall control. The public 
sector contribution can take the form of loans or equity, transfer of existing assets, and 
combinations of these. Services sold, consists in activities provided by the private sector, 
for which the government pays a fee or rent. Hammani (2006) describes PPP arrangements 
according to four types: contracts, concessions, greenfields (ex: BOT) and divestitures, 
which is basically the same classification adopted by the World Bank.12 The European 
Commission classifies PPP projects into purely contractual PPP (e.g. BOT or BOOT 
projects) and institutionalized PPP. PPP of contractual type encompass concession and 
other contracts while institutionalized PPPs concern companies with mixed capital (public 
and private). The categorizations are not exclusive, but represent different perspectives on 
the arrangements. No matter what the categorization is “ventures established under PFI 
need to achieve a genuine transfer of risk to the private sector and secure value for money 
in the use of public resources” (Allen, 2001), or as HM Treasury claims “as a general rule 
PFI schemes should always transfer to the supplier design, construction and operating 
risks (both cost and performance). Demand and other risks should be a matter of 
negotiation with the value for money impact being tested out, where appropriate, through 
bids on alternative risk transfer bases against minimum and conforming requirements.”  
 
3.5 Risk management in PPP projects 
 
In PPP project design and development, risk transfer and mitigation is the most critical 
element to successfully achieve full potential of private participation. Air transport is a 
particularly unstable and risky market. The high investments required, the sensitivity of 
revenues to macro-economic performance, and the fierce competition for routes and 
airports, makes it extremely difficult for airlines to recover full costs (Button et al., 2007) 
with great impact on airport performance. 
  
Although several categorizations of risk can be found, the one provided by Marques and 
Berg (2010) is particularly useful for this analysis. The authors present a three level risk 
categorization as shown in Table 3. 
                                               
11
 PSC is the project theoretical cost estimation if developed by traditional public procurement. It is used for 
decision makers to choose the procurement model that maximizes the project value-for-money (see more in 
Partnerships Victoria, 2001) and it often works as a maximum price (NPV) of the project.  
12
 The authors, as the European literature in general, do not agree with this categorization since it is more 
related to the concept of private sector participation and not to PPPs. Full divestiture is not a PPP arrangement 
in our opinion. 
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Table 3 – Main risks in airport development, management and operation 
Classification Type of risks 
Production Planning, Design, Expropriation, Construction, Environmental, Maintenance and Major 
Repairs, Operation, Technological and Performance. 
Commercial Demand, Collection, Capacity, Competition. 
Context Financing, Inflation, Legal, Regulation, Unilateral Changes, Public Contestation, Force 
Majeure. 
 
Production risks in airport industry are considerable, since airports are capital intensive, 
both in their construction and in maintenance activities, and cost overruns in “greenfield 
projects” are extensively known. The most important commercial risk is demand since 
demand forecasts are usually wrong (De Neufville, 2003). Air transport demand has a 
cyclical behavior, directly linked to the economic performance curve and is very sensitive 
to external factors (e.g. the SARS or the HN1 flu). 
  
Airline strategies are also of great importance when predicting traffic at the long run. For 
example, the hub-and-spoke strategy adopted by most airlines allows them to concentrate 
traffic at the main airport (hub), but if the airline is acquired by another (larger) company, 
or simply goes bankrupt, a significant traffic loss might happen. For instance, we can 
highlight the case of Zurich airport and Swissair.  
 
Context risks in the past were usually neglected, but recently they have been on the 
spotlight. The financing and inflation rates were severely affected by the economic crisis 
that stroke the entire northern hemisphere since 2008, but more strongly, in 2010. Though 
the reference interest rate (established by the European Central Bank in Europe, or the 
Federal Reserve Bank in the US) has been decreasing to historical values, in an effort to 
foster the economy, the spread, or risk premium, required by the investment banks has 
grown to unpredictable levels. The expansion or construction of airports or airport facilities 
are highly capital-consuming, making marginal increases in interest rates to have a great 
impact on the financial balance of airport management (Costa et al., 2010).  
 
Another context risk often neglected is force majeure. Since usually it is related to natural 
disaster of low, or very low, probability of occurrence, it does not seem to constitute a real 
menace. The “volcano crisis” that affected most Europe in the second quarter of 2010, has 
shown how a natural disruption can occur, with real, massive consequences on the industry. 
The European Commission has shown availability to allow for exceptional financial state-
aid packages to the airlines, but it is still unknown how, and whether, it will be applied to 
airports. 
 
 
4. PPP ARRANGEMENTS IN AIRPORT BUSINESS: REVIEW OF  
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
 
It is a fact that the private sector involvement in the airport business began with a 
privatization model, but has shifted towards more complex structures of PPP models, both 
contractual and institutionalized options. Between 1991 and 2008, the World Bank financed 
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132 projects with private sector participation in airports. Almost one third of those projects 
(46) were undertaken in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 59 were concession 
arrangements, representing 60% of the total investment, as presented in Table 4.   
 
Table 4 - Projects funded by the World Bank between 1991 and 2008 (units: US$ million) 
 
Concession Divestiture Greenfield Project 
Management and 
Lease Contract Total 
758 2,717 1,123 1 4,599 East Asia and Pacific 
5 11 9 2 27 
3,373 212 856 4,528 8,968 Europe and Central Asia 
10 7 6 6 29 
8,638 17 830 31 9,516 Latin America and the Caribbean 
35 1 6 4 46 
1,585 0 328 0 1,913 Middle East and North Africa 
3 0 4 4 11 
3,666 0 888 0 4,554 South Asia 
2 0 4 2 8 
70 169 255 0 495 Sub-Saharan Africa 
4 3 3 1 11 
18,090 3,115 4,280 4,559 30,045 Total 
59 22 32 19 132 
Note: Numbers in italic refer to the number of projects; Source: PFI Data Base (World Bank) 
 
European airports show a complex and, sometimes, confusing mix of private and public 
involvement. First, 16 out of 27 countries have some type of PPP implemented; the ones 
where no type was found are: Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. It is important to notice that this possibly 
will change in the coming years, since in some of these countries (for example, Portugal, 
Spain or Romania), the privatization (partial) of the airport authorities are already in the 
political agenda. The Portuguese case will be discussed in the next section. In those 16 
countries, 7 have airports where the contractual PPP option was implemented: Bulgaria, 
France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Malta and the United Kingdom. However, the 
institutionalized model is clearly preponderant, although different combinations were 
observed such as: public sector shareholder majority (e.g. France, Germany, Greece, Italy 
and The Netherlands) or the opposite with the majority of control by the private sector (e.g. 
Denmark, Belgium and Hungary).  
 
Cases of cross-shareholding are also found, for example between Aéroports de Paris and 
Schiphol, where each owns a participation of 8% on the other. To ensure some level of 
control on airport authorities, governments often retain the power to appoint a board 
member in the airport authority (or more than one). This happened in Amsterdam Airport, 
and it can be seen as an “informal” way of regulation, though its results are far from 
successful. In fact, as Wit (2004) points out, the supervisory board should only be 
concerned with the company’s best interests. By appointing a board member, the 
government has the “illusion” that it can influence the company’s policy. At the same time, 
the other members of the board have the impression that “hidden” interests may exist. 
Although this analysis focused on the PPP option, some airports were more a public-public 
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partnership, for example the airport of Munich, where different levels of governments are 
the only shareholders, though no data is presented regarding these schemes.  
 
The governance models are becoming particularly complex, and the real benefit of such 
arrangements is ambiguous. Oum (2006) analyzing the relation between governance 
structures and efficiency found evidence that “airports owned and managed by a mixed 
enterprise with a government-owned majority is significantly less efficient than 100% 
publicly owned and operated airports”.  
 
These are intricate results, since most European cases are precisely a mixed presence of 
public and private operators, and many with public majority. This author found no 
statistical correlation between the most efficient airports, and those privately run. In fact, 
the only statistical evidence found is that where the government has the majority of the 
shares and combines different levels of the government (local, federal and/or central) they 
are the most inefficient. 
 
 
5. PRIVATIZATION OF PORTUGUESE AIRPORTS 
 
Portugal is one of the few countries in the world where the government still owns all the 
main stakeholders in the air transport sector. The Portuguese main airline, TAP, is 100% 
owned by the Portuguese State, through a public holding named Parpública, though the 
privatization of the airline has been on the public agenda for the last decade. TAP holds 
100% of Groundforce, one of the two handling companies operating in Portugal.13 The 
other handling company, Portway, is owned by ANA Aeroportos de Portugal, the airport 
manager of the Portuguese airport system also fully public. All in all, the public sector 
owns and manages the entire Portuguese air transport value-chain. The change in this status 
quo is a political objective, but it is not the purpose of this paper to analyze the benefits or 
drawbacks of private vs. public management. At this point, the privatization of ANA is the 
most likely process to go forward, instead of TAP, for several reasons. The first is the need 
for fast revenues. The Portuguese deficit, low economic growth, and high levels of foreign 
indebtedness led to a decrease in the rating of the public debt, and forced the government to 
launch, in early 2010, a wide privatization plan. In the transport sector, ANA is the most 
attractive company to the private sector, due to the profit margins in the airport business 
able to provide large cash inflow. The second reason is the construction of the new Lisbon 
Airport. To tackle the congestion problem in Portela (Lisbon Airport), the government 
figured out to build a large, new airport, in Alcochete (50km from Lisbon), a project worth 
5 billion Euros (including accessibilities).  
                                               
13
 There are three licenses in Portugal for handling companies: GroundForce, Portway and TRIAM (operating 
in Madeira Airport), but the last one, went bankrupt. These licenses are given for periods between 1 and 7 
years (GroundForce was given a 7 year license). For passenger handling there are more companies: Servisair, 
Airpasse and PTS. For licensing services, handling activities are divided into two types: ramp handling, 
comprising all services in the ramp or apron, such as pushback, cargo handling, water cartage, lavatory 
drainage, etc.; and passenger handling: check-in, gate arrival, transfer counters, just to name a few examples.  
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Table 5 – Examples of PPP arrangements (contractual and institutionalized) in European Countries (1\2) 
Country Airport Type of PPP Observation 
Austria Vienna Institutionalized Austrian airport operator of Vienna, Flughafen Wien AG, was privatized in 1992, and nowadays 50% of shares are in the hands of private shareholders, while the other 50% are divided between the province of Lower Austria (20%), city of Vienna (20%), and a private employee participation foundation (10%).  
Brussels Institutionalized The Belgium government owns 25% of the shares of Brussels Airport Company, and the remaining 75% are owned by a private investor, the Australian Group Map Airports. 
Belgium 
Charleroi Institutionalized 
The low-cost airport of Charleroi is another example of institutionalized PPP, where the Regional Authorities own 28% of the shares, Sowaer 49%, Sambrinvest 19% 
(venture capital firm), Sabca (private construction company) 1%, and Sonaca (aerospace industry) 1%. The influence of the public authority in the airport management is 
larger than the one provided by its shares, because the Regional Authority also owns 100% of Sowaer (a society created in 2001 to manage the financial participations of 
the Region and manage real-estate development around the airport, and also holds 24.15% of Liege Airport) and 50% of Sambrinvest.  
Burgas 
Bulgaria Varna 
Contractual 
Fraport Twin Star Airport Management: At the end of year 2006 the German-Bulgarian consortium of the worldwide famous airport operator Fraport AG and the Bulgarian 
logistic company BM Star won the competition for the concession of Varna and Burgas airports – the air gateways to the popular Bulgarian Black Sea tourist region. 
During the 35-year concession period Fraport Twin Star Airport Management will operate and invest in the development of both costal airports. Concession contracts were 
signed in 2005 before the beginning of the busy summer season. The 35-year contract will have an option for a 15-year extension.   
Larnaca 
Cyprus 
Pafos 
Institutionalized 
Cyprus has three international airports: Larnaca, Ercan, and Paphos. Ercan airport is situated in the Turkish area of Cyprus, and is publicly run, although privatization plans 
for increasing capacity (runway length and a new terminal building) are in the agenda. An entirely different model was developed for Larnaka and Pafos, the two largest 
Cypriot airports, run through a 25-year concession contract, established between the consortium (Hermes Airports) and the Republic of Cyprus, in July 2005. The 
concession agreement included investments for the construction of a new passenger building, as well as aprons and runway extensions, which was the largest construction 
contract done in the Republic, and was developed under a BOT scheme (622 million Euros). The shareholders structure of Hermes Airport Ltd has investors from a very 
large diversity: the French construction group Bouygues Batiment International (22%), the French infrastructure group Egis Projects (20%), Cyprus Trading Corporation 
(11.34%), Hellenic Mining (11.33%), Vancouver Airport Services (11%), Aer Rianta International (11%), Iacovou Brothers (5.665%), Charilaos Apostolides (5.665%) and 
the French airport operator Aéroport Nice Côte D’Azur Chambre de Commerce et D’Industrie (2%). One of the main shareholders (Bouygues Batiment International) was 
responsible for all public works to update and construct facilities, subcontracting the local partners (Iacovou and Charilaos). Cyprus Trading Corporation and Aer Rianta 
manage duty-free retailing.  
The agreement established an annual fee of 33% of gross revenue to the Cyprus government and a fixed annual fee of 3.5 million Euros.  
Czech 
Republic Prague Institutionalized 
Prague Airport is owned and managed by a joint stock company with the same name.  
Denmark Cope-
nhagen Institutionalized 
The largest airport in Denmark, Copenhagen Airport, is managed by Københavns Lufthavne, a public limited company. The main shareholders are the Macquarie Group 
(52.4%) and the Denmark government (39.2%). Originally it was a government enterprise and was transformed into a limited company in 1990. Four years later, the 
government sold 25%, and listed the company in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Københavns Lufthavne also holds stocks in other airport operators, like the Newcastle 
International Airport (where it holds 49%), and Aeropuertos del Surest (10%), that operates nine airports in Mexico.  
 
Estonia No PPPs 
Finland No PPPs 
Paris - 
CDG 
Paris - 
Orly 
Institutionalized 
Aéroports de Paris is operating under a 99 year concession, and it is owned by the French government (52.1%), the Schiphol Group (8.0%), Caisse de Dépôts et 
Consignations (8.6%), French institutional Investors (11.4%), Non-French resident institutional investors (11.4%), French individuals and unidentified shareholders 
(8.6%), Employees (2.1%) and Treasury shares (0.1%).   
Marseille 
Provence Contractual 
The Marseille Provence Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) has managed the airport since 1934, and in 1987 the concession arrangement was renewed for a 30-
year period by the French State.  
Nice 
France 
Cannes Institutionalized 
The Aéroports de la Côte d’Azur is owned by the State (60%), the French Riviera Chamber of Commerce (25%), and 15% distributed equally between Region of Provence 
Alpes Côte d’ Azur, Alpes-Maritimes Regional Councils and Urban Community of Nice.  
 
- 14 - 
Table 5 – Examples of PPP arrangements (contractual and institutionalized) in European Countries (2\2) 
Country Airport Type of PPP Observation 
Frankfurt Institutionalized 
In Frankfurt’s main airport, the manager/operator is Fraport, hold by the Sate of  Hesse (31.52%), the city of Frankfurt (20.13%), and private corporations like Artio 
Global Investors (10.35%), Deutsche Lufthansa AG (5.01%), Taube Hodson Stonex Partners (3.59%), Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder Holdings, Inc. (2.98%) and Morgan 
Stanley (2.94%). 18.59% are in the hands of anonymous shareholders. 
Dussel-
dorf Institutionalized 
In Dusseldorf (the first German airport to be partially privatized), 50% belongs to the Landeshauptstadt Dusseldorf (state capital) while 50% belong to Airport Partners 
GmbH (owned in 40% Hochtief AirPort GmbH, 20% Hochtief AirPort Capital KGaA, 40% Dublin Airport Authority plc (through its wholly owned subsidiary Aer Rianta 
International cpt). 
Germany 
Berlin-
Branden-
burg 
Contractual 
A concession was signed, for 99 years, for Berlin-Brandenburg new airport. The winning bid belongs to IVG Holding and Hochtief Airport, together in a consortium 
called Berlin-Brandenburg International Partner. In this greenfield project, the government role was to resettle the population in two small villages (Diepensee and 
Selchow) and build rail and road infrastructures.  
Greece Athens Contractual 
Athens International Airport is commonly referred to when speaking about the PPP option in airports. Established in 1996, it was awarded the construction and 
management of Eleftherios Venizelos airport for a 30-year BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) concession scheme. The company responsible for the construction and 
operation of the airport is owned by the Greek State (55%), while Hochtief AirPort GmbH and Hochtief AirPort Capital, owned 26.667% and 13.333% respectively, and 
5% belongs to Copelouzos Group. The Airport Company is not permitted to perform any operations outside this area. Also, all of its operations are expected to be related 
directly to the business of managing the Airport. All ground accessibility to the airport will be provided by the Greek state.  
Holland Schiphol Institutionalized Schiphol Group is the entity responsible for the management and operation of Schiphol Airport. 69.77% of shares belong to the Dutch government, 20.03% to the Municipality of Amsterdam, 2.20% to the Municipality de Rotterdam and 8% to Aéroports de Paris.  
 
 
 
 
Hungary Budapest Institutionalized 
Budapest airport is run by Budapest Airport Zrt., a company owned by the Hungarian State (25% plus one vote), which sold in 2007 the remaining shares. Hochtief 
AirPort became the main shareholder (37.25%), and several financial investors acquired participations: Gic Special Investment (13.625%), Caisse de depot et placement 
du Québec (13.625%), Aero Investment (7.5%) and KfW IPEX-Bank (3%).  
Ireland No PPPs 
Milano Institutionalized SEA Aeroporti de Milano, controlling Linate and Malpensa airports, has the following shareholder structure: Municipality of Milan 84.56%, ASAM (Azienda Sviluppo Acqua e Mobilitá) 14.56% and other minor public and private shareholders (0.88%).  Italy 
Rome Institutionalized Aeriporti de Roma could be considered a private firm because the shares owned by the public sector are 3%, while 95.8 % belong to Gemina (an Italian holding company listed in the stock exchange market). 
Latvia Riga Contractual Riga Airport is one of the latest airports in Europe developed under a PPP scheme, in this case, a BOT agreement. The concession included the construction of a new terminal and the operation of the entire airport.  
Lithuania No PPPs 
Luxembu. No PPPs 
Malta Malta Contractual Malta International Airport handled 2.9 MPax (2009), and is run by the company with the same name. In 2002, the Maltese government sold 40% of the company to the Malta Mediterranean Link Consortium Ltd (a 93.6 million Euros trade). In 2002 and 2005, the government sold extra 40% (20% each year), to smaller private investors.  
Poland No PPPs 
Portugal No PPPs 
Romania No PPPs 
Slovakia No PPPs 
Slovenia Ljubljana Institutionalized Aerodrom Ljubljana, the company owning and managing the Ljubljana Airport, is owned in 51% by the Republic of Slovenia, 7% by the Pension fund, 6% by the Slovenian Restitution Fund and 19% by the Private Companies and other 16 legal entities.  
Spain No PPPs 
Sweden No PPPs 
Newcas-
tle Institutionalized 
The company structure of Newcastle International Airport is the result of an agreement by the airport’s seven local authority shareholders to enter into a PPP arrangement 
with Copenhagen Airports in May 2001. As part of the establishment of a PPP arrangement for the future, the local authority shareholders sold 49% of its shares to the 
Company to Copenhagen Airports and the Company has entered into a 15 year Technical Services Agreement with Copenhagen Airports. 
United 
Kingdom 
Norwich Institutionalized Norwich International Airport is owned in 80.1% by Omniport (private investor) and the remaining shares belong to Norwich City and County Council.  
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The government decided to bundle the construction of the new airport with the sale of 
ANA, and so, recently, announced a single tendering procedure. The national airport 
network will be put on sale. To legally sustain this procedure, the government approved in 
April 2010, the concession basis for the airport system (Decree-Law 33/2010). This 
legislation grants to ANA the exclusivity of running and operating the airports in Portugal, 
and the obligation of building the New Lisbon Airport by 2017. One may argue about the 
economic rationality of constraining the future buyer decisions. In fact, the option of 
building or not, or when to build the new airport is eliminated, thus reducing the global 
economic value of ANA (see more in Costa et al., 2010). It is also questionable the creation 
of a monopoly in the management of the entire system. The decision of selling all airports 
in the same “package”, forbidding the construction of new facilities in a radius of 150km 
from each airport (deleting any future competition), maximizes the value of sale, but it is 
arguable that it maximizes the welfare, since for 40 years no competition will be allowed. 
The organization in a monopoly is also arguable. Marques (2010a) found and there is 
evidence that best efficiency results might be achieved if airports were independently 
managed. In fact, the “quiet life” and X-inefficiency arising from the lack of incentives 
provided by the regulator which does not have independence might have consequences in 
the quality of service and decrease global economic welfare, though the financial and 
economic indicators reveal a solid and profitable company (Marques, 2010b). The same 
author claims the urgency in adopting more effective regulation tools to “shake” the quiet 
life of ANA (Marques, 2010b).14 This decision has raised some discussions on the industry 
organization model for the Portuguese airport system. The process, as designed, will allow 
for private participation in the management of the system, but it will keep a public sector 
participation in the company. It is unclear at this time what will be the percentage of sale 
(majority vs. minority), and what will be the private sector role in the management of the 
firm. The regulatory model, which is key for the future of the airport sector in Portugal, is 
not defined and in order to add value to the privatization business it is likely that weak 
commitments and poor incentives are provided to the private ‘entrant’. The existing market 
structure (only one company) demands a sound and a tighter regulation. So, major risks are 
also likely to be retained in the public sector with the aim of maximizing the up-front 
payment. Public interest might also be put at risk since exclusivity grants can jeopardize the 
growth and the appearance of new low-cost carriers leading them to move to other 
destinations and damaging the tourism which is one of the most important industries in 
Portugal. The example of the Airport of Athens is elucidating in this respect, since this 
phenomenon and type of customer was not conveniently envisaged.  Finally, it should be 
highlighted that the business of selling ANA and the construction of the new airport, due to 
its size (and current worldwide financial context), possibly will not attract many bidders. 
Therefore, competition for the market, which is one of the major advantages of PPP 
arrangements, probably will not work.     
 
 
 
                                               
14
 The author suggests price-cap regulation, instead of rate-of-return and the use of benchmarking tools 
(sunshine regulation) in addition to “carrot and stick” policies.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Private sector participation in airport development and management is growing and it 
seems that it will continue to grow in a near future. Governments are facing increasing 
difficulties in issuing debt, and the capacity expansion and/or refurbishment works 
necessary to keep the international quality standards in airports will tend to be developed 
and financed by private entities. Unfortunately, unlike a couple of years ago, the financial 
sector is not so eager to finance these large investments, even with governmental 
guarantees, due to the difficulty of financing themselves in the international market, 
specially those from countries where downgrading from the rating agencies is undergoing, 
like Greece, Spain or Portugal. Although efficiency related arguments can be used, the 
main reason for PPP usage relies on the easy and faster way to get large amounts of money 
and/or to avoid public spending in infrastructure development. One of the boosters of 
privatization, the Thatcher government, did it in a time of excessive public deficit, and 
privatization was developed to increase income to the state budget. The latest example of 
Athens International Airport or the future new Lisbon Airport confirm this thesis. The 
Greek government was able to build an airport through a long-term concession, mainly at 
the expenses of private investors (and airport users), and in Portugal the privatization of 
ANA will allow for the construction of the new Lisbon airport. In the case of contractual 
PPPs, the authors found it impossible to get the contracts, or any information related to 
renegotiations and compensations paid by governments. The lack of transparency and 
public scrutiny regarding these PPP arrangements do not favor international benchmarks 
and the dissemination of best practices. This is a particularly relevant issue, since these long 
lasting contracts only happen once, creating discontinuity in the how-know. The 
dissemination of contract arrangements, especially as far as risk-sharing is concerned, is 
relevant to allow for contracts to be less incomplete. Marques and Brochado (2008) 
recommended the creation of a European Observatory able to deal with the airport sector 
heterogeneity (ownership’ structures, airport characteristics –congestion, catering mainly 
full-service or low-cost airlines, hub or destination traffic and accounting practices) to 
prevent predatory practices and market power abuses, but this observatory could also 
perform an important role in the dissemination of best practices and monitoring of PPP 
arrangements in the EU area. More work is required for the development of successful 
partnerships. At this point, it is very difficult to evaluate the benefits of PPP arrangements 
in airport development. There is little information regarding both the role of each partner 
(public and private) in the project and risk-sharing. This is a key driver for the success of 
PPP projects. The “first wave” of projects developed under this procurement model was 
sustained on the possibility of the “off-sheet” status of this model. 
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